


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TURKEY'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1952



TURKISH INFORMATION OFFICE

444 East 52nd Street, New York 22, N. Y.



Prof. Fuat Köprülü, *Foreign Minister*

FUAT KÖPRÜLÜ

World-renowned Turkish historian, was born in Istanbul in 1890, the descendant of an old family of Grand Viziers that attained fame under the Ottoman Empire.

Educated in Istanbul, he achieved early recognition. At the age of 23 was appointed professor of the history of literature at Istanbul University, and was elected chairman of the Faculty of Letters on several occasions. In 1924, he became Under-Secretary to the Minister of Education.

Köprülü lectured on political history at the School of Political Sciences, and was professor of the history of civilization at the Academy of Fine Arts. He founded the Institute of Turkish Studies in 1924, and in 1927 became president of the Turkish Historical Society.

He has attended a large number of international conferences on oriental culture and civilization: Paris, 1923; Baku, 1926; Oxford, 1928; Lund, 1929; Harkoff, 1929; Teheran, 1934, etc.

Fuat Köprülü holds numerous honorary degrees from foreign universities (including Paris, Heidelberg, and Athens) and is a corresponding member of several international learned societies (including the Hungarian and the Czechoslovak Oriental Institutes, the German Archaeological Institute, etc.). In 1948 he was expelled from membership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences (to which he was elected in 1925) because of his enmity towards all totalitarian regimes.

Author of more than twenty volumes on literature and history, his private library is one of the most extensive in Turkey.

Köprülü resigned his professorships in 1943, to give all his time to politics, and was one of the original founders of the Democratic Party in 1945-46. He became Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 22, 1950, in the government headed by Adnan Menderes, formed as a result of the Democratic Party winning a sweeping victory in the general elections held May 14, 1950. During his tenure of office Turkey was among the first to offer military help against aggression in South Korea. She became a full member of the Atlantic Pact and a co-sponsor of the Middle East Command.

TURKEY'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1952

Turkish Foreign Minister Prof. Fuat Köprülü's review of Turkey's foreign relations in 1951, before the Grand National Assembly on December 19, 1951:

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS:

The statement which I made before the U.N. General Assembly in Paris on the subject of general disarmament has already appeared in the press. Therefore I shall confine my remarks on this occasion to remind you of the fact that I reconfirmed our attachment to the United Nations by supporting the American-British-French proposal to limit and control armament, which constituted another effort to preserve the peace and also aimed at making it possible for world public opinion to differentiate between those who are and those who are not imbued with good-will.

It would be somewhat naïve to expect that the current General Assembly session of the United Nations will result in a solution of the difficulties amidst which the world is groping its way, or that it will find a remedy for the grave danger that confronts mankind. On the other hand it would be completely wrong and dangerous to despair of the outcome or incline to the view that the United Nations is a useless organization. From the primary viewpoint of their own individual interests, it is a duty for every peace-loving state to remain faithful to and work to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations which provides the only opportunity for even the most knotty problems to be debated by the representatives of sixty nations. This means that the United Nations not only ensures an enlightened public opinion by affording a chance to submit new proposals and make new experiments, but also succeeded in utilizing the basic mentality of the United Nations in a practical field when it overcame every obstacle placed in the way of establishing a United Nations front to oppose the aggressor in Korea. That is why we are faithful to the United Nations organization, and why we shall continue to work with utmost faith, sincerity, and patient perseverance to make it increasingly stronger.

CONTACTS IN PARIS:

My contacts in Paris during the U.N. General Assembly meetings gave me a chance for personal discussions with the foreign ministers and diplomats of our friends and allies, and I perceived that (led by Mr. Schuman, Mr. Acheson, and Mr. Eden) they were of the same opinion with respect to the value of the work being done by the United Nations.

My contacts with my colleagues from the United States, Britain, and France inspired in me the firm conviction that there is a feeling of solid confidence toward Turkey, that we are justified in our own confidence in them, and that future contacts and negotiations between ourselves and their governments will be conducted in the light of their conviction that continued close cooperation with us is essential.

TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE ATLANTIC PACT:

Our membership in the Atlantic Pact will constitute a contractual manifestation of this cooperation, serving to strengthen mutual security as well as democratic society.

You will recall that at the September 1951 meeting of the Atlantic Pact Council at Ottawa, the representatives of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided unanimously that Turkey and Greece should be invited to join the Pact. There were certain formalities to be completed before this decision could be translated to the domain of practical application. The first of these was to modify Art. 6 of the Pact to make it possible for the total territories of Turkey and Greece to become incorporated into membership; this was accomplished in London last month when the representatives of member countries signed a protocole to that effect.

The second formality necessitates the ratification of this protocole, and the formal ratification of the Ottawa invitation in accordance with the provisions of the particular legislative procedures of each member country, prior to giving the United States government official notice of such ratification. Norway and Denmark have already completed the formality of ratification, while Britain has not only ratified the invitation but has also advised the United States government of the fact.

The delay in completing these formalities on the part of the United States which played a most gratifying role in securing the invitation for Turkey to join the Pact stems from the fact that the U. S. legislature which is empowered by the Constitution to effect ratification is still in recess. I am in a position to express the well-founded opinion that ratification by the other member countries will not be long delayed. I am also glad to say that the rumors which circulated or were purposely planted at one time, to the effect that our entry into the Atlantic Pact was not to be on a footing of absolute equality with the other member states, have now been discredited in the light of clear-cut developments. There now remains the question of the position to be occupied by Turkey within the framework of the military measures envisaged by the Pact, when her membership becomes an accomplished fact.

Because this matter is still undecided, I would like to say merely that our national interests are identical from every standpoint with the joint interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and with its geographic and military requirements, and it is therefore only natural and logical that a satisfactory result will be attained. Our government has examined this matter thoroughly and from every angle, and has kept the interested foreign governments informed of the clear-cut and decisive conclusions which were reached. No decision was arrived at in this connection at the Rome meetings of the Atlantic Pact where (because we are not yet a member of the Pact) we were represented only by an Observer (the Turkish Ambassador to Rome). As decided during the preliminary exchange of views which took place in Ankara in October (1951) with the participation of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Field Marshall Sir William Slim, and Gen. Charles Leclerc, Admiral Aziz Ulusan (Head of the Turkish General Staff's Intelligence Section) and an assistant have been appointed to establish preparatory contact with the NATO Military Committee in Washington. If these contacts develop at a sufficiently speedy rate and if the legal formalities pertaining to our joining the Atlantic Pact are completed by that time, it will be possible to discuss this matter at the meeting of the Atlantic Pact Council scheduled to be held with our participation at Lisbon in

February, 1952. I believe there is no need to repeat the fact that, come what may, there can be no question of the adoption of any decision pertaining to us that does not entail our concurrence and agreement.

THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND:

Before departing from the subject of mutual security I would like to outline the situation with respect to the projected Middle East Command.

This question has given rise to interpretations which may be divided into two categories. One of these categories is made up of the malicious rumors which the Moscow government desires to put into circulation. You will recall that the Soviet Foreign Ministry handed a note to the Turkish Ambassador at Moscow and also to the Ambassadors of the United States, Britain, and France (that is to say, to the Ambassadors of the four states which originated the idea of a Middle East Command). These notes alleged that, like the Atlantic Pact, the project to establish a Middle East Command was based on aggressive intentions aimed at the Soviet Union, that those who sought to establish such a Command desired to deprive the Middle Eastern states of their independence, and that it was the aim to transform each of them into bases for aggressive operations against Russia. (Shortly before the delivery of these notes, Moscow had handed notes to the Middle Eastern states, virtually warning them not to participate in the Middle East Command). Our reply to the note which was handed to us is on the point of being forwarded to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The text of this reply will be made public following its delivery. I shall not dwell at greater length on this aspect of the matter, because it would only be a waste of your time to state once again that we have no aggressive ambitions against anyone, and that we do not desire to violate the independence and freedom of any state.

THE NATURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND:

I would now like to discuss the second category of rumors and interpretations.

What will be the exact nature of the Middle East Command which is manifestly based on defensive aims alone? Which are

the states that will come within its scope? What will be the obligations to be assumed by the participating states? Does it have any connection with the Atlantic Pact? I believe that it will serve a useful purpose to provide you with the answers to these questions which appear in the Turkish press as well as in the press of other countries.

The aim here is to draw up plans for the defense against aggression of the Middle East, which is unfortunately open to outside aggression despite its moral and material importance, and also to determine and provide in the largest possible measure the military needs of the Middle Eastern states to organize such a defense.

It is naturally desired that every Middle Eastern state, and each of the other states that have an interest in the defense of this area, should participate in the Middle East Command. If they desire to do so, they will adhere to the Command on a basis of equality, and after discussing and arguing all details with the other participants.

There is no question of any decisions being taken in the sphere of military measures, or with respect to the troops to be placed at the disposal of the Command, without first consulting the desires and securing the consent of the different states in matters that concern them.

FUTURE PLANS:

No engagement has been entered into and no plan of action has been formulated so far among the four states which sponsored the idea of a Middle East Command. These are matters that will be taken care of in due course and placed on solid legal and political foundations in accordance with the development of events.

The points that have been established to date are those that come within the loose framework outlined in the memorandum which was delivered to Egypt in the first instance and later (on November 10, 1951) to the other Arab states and to Israel, on the understanding that they are to be discussed in case of need with such states as may decide to join. The texts of these memoranda have been made public, and I see no need

to repeat them here. On the other hand I would like to underline the fact that, as proven by the texts themselves, there are no conditions in them which it is desired to impose on anyone. The aim is to organize a system of cooperation for defense as dictated by the interests of each member state as well as by the interests of the Middle East area in general, without damaging in any way the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of the member nations.

The draft proposal previously submitted to the Egyptian government contained certain detailed information because it was hoped that this proposal would serve to straighten out a specific political situation. It will be recalled that this was when Egypt had announced her intention to nullify its treaty of 1936 with Great Britain, and it was thought that the Middle East Command might constitute the required type of multi-lateral agreement to form a basis for resolving the dispute between Egypt and Britain which appeared to be insoluble by way of bilateral discussions. In place of the British military forces and installations that are in the Suez Canal Zone in accordance with the treaty between Egypt and Britain which is operative until 1956, there would be created a Middle East Command in which Egypt would participate as a charter member with equal rights and obligations. It is provided in the project for a Middle East Command that such forces would be reduced in proportion to the increase in Egypt's own military potential. Such an arrangement, entirely in keeping with the vital interests of all Middle Eastern states and particularly of Egypt, would not only serve the cause of preserving world peace and security but would also lay the firm foundations for a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.

Unfortunately, however, the Egyptian government not only refrained from entering into discussion of this matter but lost no time in giving a negative reply without even asking for additional details.

I regret to state that while acting in this hasty manner Egypt also misconstrued our own very friendly and sincere course of action. The unseemly excesses that certain irresponsible elements in Egypt have shown towards us recently have given

rise to justifiable pain and indignation in Turkey. We could have expected the Egyptian government not to remain indifferent in face of these excesses.

THE OTHER ARAB STATES, AND ISRAEL:

Before returning to the subject of the Middle East Command I would like to express the hope that there will be a speedy end to this disagreeable situation.

After Egypt, the four-power project for a Middle East Command was submitted to the other Arab states and to Israel. The aim was to inform them regarding the nature of the Middle East Command and to acquaint ourselves with their own points of view; and also to stress officially the fact that adherence to this arrangement (planned in the interests of each state and for the security of the Middle East, and rendered imperative by developments) would be based on unconstrained discussion and argument, that it would not violate the sovereignty and freedom of the interested parties, and that it was in fact designed to safeguard such independence and sovereignty.

MUTUAL SECURITY:

The security of the Middle East is synonymous with the security of our southern flank. Reciprocally, the security of the Middle East is assured in very large measure by our own security. That is why reciprocal interests lead us to hope that a situation will develop one of these days that will make it possible to discuss the matter of the Middle East Command where our interests are identical.

At a time such as the present when we are on the threshold of membership in the Atlantic Pact, it was thought in certain circles that (because of our geographic location) there was some connection between the Middle East Command and our participation and defensive role in the Atlantic Pact. The fact remains, however, that these two matters are entirely distinct one from the other. On the one hand there is a defensive combination based on contractual engagements (the Atlantic Pact), while on the other hand there is nothing but an idea or project which lacks contractual foundations and has still to be worked on; and it is impossible to find a logical basis for combining the two.

Our participation in the Atlantic Pact has no connection whatever with the realization of the Middle East Command. We shall first enter the Atlantic Pact to take our place within its framework on a basis of equal rights and obligations with the other member states; and then we will occupy ourselves with matters pertaining to the Middle East Command in co-operation with the United States, Britain, and France who are also members of the Atlantic Pact and agreed as to the need for a Middle East Command.

RELATIONS WITH SYRIA:

You are aware of the fact that a change of government took place in Syria, resulting in the seating of a new chief of state. We considered this to be an internal matter and lost no time in establishing normal relations with the new government. We are sincerely desirous of maintaining friendly relations with the new government, which recently assured us through its Charge d'Affaires in Ankara that there would be no change in their policy. We shall always endeavor to maintain close friendly relations with this neighbor for which we nurture sentiments of utmost good will, and for which we desire happiness and prosperity in complete stability. As has been frequently stated, our sentiments are identical also in the case of all the other Arab states, whether near or far, with whom we have an identity of interests and to whom we are attached with numerous moral ties.

FRIENDLY SENTIMENTS TOWARDS IRAN:

It grieves us profoundly to observe the continuation of the dispute between Britain and our neighbor Iran for whom we are imbued with sentiments of deep friendship. When this dispute first materialized we remained neutral and extended friendly advice to both sides. The aim was to prevent haste in arriving at decisions which might have given rise to a situation that would make it impossible to enter into conciliatory discussions at a later date. While our efforts in this direction were not completely unproductive, it is regrettable that no agreement has yet been reached between the parties concerned. It is our wholehearted hope that this dispute will be resolved in the near future.

THE SOVIET WAR OF NERVES:

In the course of this review of our relations with our neighbors I shall not dwell at length on our relations with Soviet Russia. The analysis which I made recently from this platform with respect to the response of the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the reply which we had made to their earlier objections to Turkey's projected membership in the Atlantic Pact will have shown you that this neighbor has intensified its war of nerves against us. A recent article in an American magazine stated that Turkey has been subjected to a war of nerves for centuries. There is great truth in this observation which stresses the fact that, as a nation, we have very strong nerves. As I pointed out the other day, the ease of conscience engendered by our determined and straightforward policy which is free of the slightest ill-will only serves to make our traditionally strong nerves even stronger.

BULGARIA AND THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:

As for Bulgaria, which is eager to apply the same sort of policy towards us as do the Soviets, the government there has furnished new proof of its ill-will vis-a-vis Turkey.

Because Bulgaria refused to prevent the arrival of gypsies with forged visas who mingled with the Bulgarians of Turkish ancestry who are being expelled from Bulgaria, and in the face also of her unwillingness to take back these persons who had arrived in Turkey in a totally irregular manner, we were forced to close the frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria when we perceived that our patient efforts had no effect either in putting a stop to these arrivals or in securing the departure of those who had already arrived illegally.

As was to be expected, the Bulgarian government attempted to interpret this move as an ill-intentioned failure to abide by contractual obligations, issued a communique which accused us of refusing to receive immigrants, and announced its decision to halt all emigration.

The communique which we issued in response the other day encountered no difficulty in repudiating the Bulgarian allegations one by one, and stressed our awareness of the fact that Bulgaria had been getting ready to stop emigration for some

time, so that our closing of the frontier provided them with the opportunity to do what they were already planning to do.

Despite the fact that we were compelled to close the frontier, we instructed our Charge d'Affaires at Sofia to inform the Bulgarian government that we were prepared to accept into Turkey and thereby save from additional misery some 1,500 refugees who were left stranded on the other side of the border.

The statement in response made to our Charge d'Affaires by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister on November 10, 1951, is worthy of note: after stating that these 1,500 refugees had been withdrawn and would no longer be permitted to emigrate, the minister said that his government had realised it was a mistake to permit persons of Turkish origin to be sent to Turkey, because their departure resulted in a sensible weakening of Bulgarian economy.

When the accusations made in the recent Bulgarian communique to explain the reasons behind the stoppage of emigration are compared with the statement made by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, and when the previous Bulgarian allegation to the effect that these emigrants were made up solely of persons who had freely expressed a desire to emigrate is studied side by side with the minister's use of the expression 'to send', I leave it to you to draw your own conclusions as to the true state of affairs. Copies of the notes exchanged in this connection have been forwarded to the Secretariat of the United Nations along with a copy of our above-mentioned communique, with the request that they be distributed to U.N. members. The remarks made by the Bulgarian Foreign Minister will also be submitted to the same quarter.

The outline which I have given you thus far of our bi-lateral foreign relations has dealt for the most part with incidents of an unpleasant or regrettable nature. We are thankful for the fact that the good will shown by our government and the policy of friendship which we endeavor to apply towards every other state have also yielded results of a more productive character.

RELATIONS WITH THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES:

Our relations with the Western Democracies continue to develop in an atmosphere of excellent harmony and complete understanding both in multi-lateral organizations (such as the European Council and the European Payments Union) and in direct reciprocal relations.

GERMANY:

It is our hope, and we consider it essential, that the Federal West German Republic will occupy with the least possible delay the important economic, political, and military position which awaits it as a democratic and peace-loving state in the community of European nations. Having put a legal end to the state of war between Turkey and Germany and elevated to the rank of Ambassador the status of our respective diplomatic representatives, our relations with Germany are on the way to speedy development, especially from the commercial viewpoint.

PORTUGAL:

Our Legation at Lisbon was closed some years ago for reasons of budgetary economy, and the Turkish Ambassador to Paris had been accredited to Lisbon too. We shall be re-opening our Legation at Lisbon and will appoint a Minister shortly to this important and friendly country with which we are about to contract an alliance within the Atlantic Pact.

BRITAIN AND FRANCE:

I would like to mention especially the closeness and understanding which permeates our relations with our allies Britain and France. We have made it almost a tradition to maintain close contacts and to engage in frank consultations with these two states and with the United States to ensure coordinated action in matters of foreign policy that concern each of us. We note with pleasure that we are always agreed on the common aim to ensure that both our own interests and the interests of other parties, and the interests of world peace and stability, shall be reconciled in the most equitable and reasonable manner.

FRIENDSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES:

I would like to emphasize especially the fact that our friendship and cooperation with the United States shows daily progress and development in an atmosphere of complete understanding and harmony. There is not the slightest doubt that the active participation of this great democracy in world affairs constitutes the most important event of the mid-twentieth century from the viewpoint of aiding universal recovery and preserving the free world from becoming the victim of imperialistic and egotistical forces.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to tell you about the American aid which constitutes for us a most valuable and beneficial demonstration of the confident relations between our great friend the United States and ourselves.

AMERICAN AID:

Direct aid secured for the 1950-51 fiscal year while our own 1951 budget was still being debated amounted to no more than 17.5 million dollars. A later grant of 27.5 million dollars increased this direct aid to 45 million dollars. Although the decision to utilize the 25 million dollar initial credit was adopted before the debates on the budget, its actual use took place in the period which followed the approval and adoption of the budget. This means that a total of 52.5 million dollars (27.5 million in direct aid and 25 million in initial aid — initial credit within the European Payments Agreement) was secured for the 1950-51 period after the budgetary debates, and 45 million dollars in aid was obtained for the 1951-52 period. This latter figure is to be increased to 70 million dollars.

In the same way, military aid of 150 million dollars was secured for the 1950-51 period, and of 240 million for 1951-52 (a total of 390 million dollars) after the passage of the budget for 1951.

Thus the total of military and economic aid obtained from the United States after the approval of our own budget amounted to 487.5 million dollars. This figure does not include the 25 million dollars which is earmarked to be given for the latter portion of the 1951-52 period.

With reference to the counterpart funds which represent another form of American economic aid, the amount released prior to the passage of the 1951 budget was only 82.5 million Turkish liras. Following the approval of the budget, agreement was reached with the ECA for them to release 296 million Turkish liras in counterpart funds for the balance of fiscal year 1951 and another 100,000,000 liras during the 1952 budget period. This arrangement is being carried out gradually.

It should also be stated that in the calendar year 1951 Turkey has received from the United States 72.5 million dollars for economic and 240 million dollars of military aid. This represents a Turkish lira equivalent of 880 million liras. If we add this to the amount included in the budget out of counterpart funds for productive projects and the contribution to our military budget (which make a total of 296 million Turkish liras), the American aid mentioned above is seen to be of some 1,176,000,000 Turkish liras; and this is certainly much higher than the figure of 500,000,000 Turkish liras mentioned by the opposition press in Turkey.

RELATIONS WITH ITALY:

Our relations with Italy are developing in complete harmony and reciprocal confidence based on a community of interests and identical political viewpoint. As recommended by the European Council, we reached mutual agreement with Italy recently with regard to certain conditions pertaining to the abolition of visa formalities for citizens of our two countries; and the notes exchanged to this effect have been added to the contractual ties between us which constitute the tokens and proof of this development.

You are aware of the fact that the Security Council is taking up again the question of admitting Italy and certain other countries to membership in the United Nations. I am sure there is no need to assure you that we made haste to cast our vote in favor of the proposal to ensure that this important and peace-loving state shall cease to remain outside the United Nations organization.

COOPERATION WITH GREECE:

The cooperation and unity of aim that exists between our-

selves and our close friend Greece will assume a more concrete and active character within the Atlantic Pact which we are about to join.

YUGOSLAVIA AND SPAIN:

Our relations with Yugoslavia are extremely favorable to development. Relations are in a state of fortunate development with our old friend Spain which occupies a most important position not only in the Mediterranean but also in world politics.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA:

Relations with Pakistan and India are developing in a manner commensurate with the traditional affection that exists between us. We shall be submitting to your approval shortly the treaties of friendship recently concluded with Pakistan and India, and also the cultural agreement signed with India.

It is with anxiety that we are following the disagreement between India and Pakistan which entails great potential loss from the viewpoint of their own interests and fortunes as well as for the preservation of world peace. We have been extending to both sides the friendly advice that this matter should be accorded cool-headed and understanding treatment. With respect to Kashmir, this is a matter which concerns us because of our membership on the Security Council. It is unfortunate that this problem has not yet been resolved. In delicate situations of this type we are suggesting to both parties that they should isolate themselves from meaningless considerations of prestige, and endeavor to prevent public opinion from impulsive acts of an irreparable nature. The series of incidents observed recently in certain countries furnish ample proof of how difficult it becomes to stem the flood of agitated public opinion that is once set in motion.

AFGHANISTAN, INDONESIA, LIBYA:

We are imbued with the same sentiments of anxiety, and are exerting the same sincerely friendly efforts at conciliation, in connection with the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan which are both our very close friends.

We shall adopt positive measures to send to our friend Indonesia the Minister whose appointment has been delayed for purely technical reasons.

We shall be among the foremost to welcome Libya into the community of free nations and enter into relations with her when she becomes an independent state at the outcome of what may be described as one of the fruitful results of the work of the United Nations.

JAPAN:

We shall submit to your approval in the near future the peace treaty which we signed with great pleasure with Japan, to make it possible for her to occupy the important position which she merits in Far Eastern and world politics.

THE SITUATION IN KOREA:

While discussing the Far East I would like to broach the subject of the situation in Korea.

I am of the opinion that we should not be too optimistic regarding the outcome of the armistice talks which are now taking place there. I do not wish to state categorically that there is no possibility of an armistice, however, for it may become possible to conclude an armistice if the United Nations front continues to wage war in a manner that will make it clear to the Communists that the continuation of hostilities will become increasingly more damaging for them.

It is not a realistic line of thought to expect that an armistice will result in South and North Korea becoming united in a single, independent state. There remains also the fact that it is necessary to view the problem of Korea in the light of the present tense world situation rather than as an isolated matter. This means that it would be equally unrealistic to consider that even the conclusion of an armistice would constitute the beginning of a return to peace and stability in the Far East. The return of the Far East to tranquillity will become possible only in proportion to the elimination of world tension itself.

In spite of these negative possibilities, we can state categorically that the U.N. action in hastening to the aid of South Korea when it became the victim of aggression constituted an

act of utmost foresight to preserve world peace and discourage aggression. Had this not been done, the world situation would have been more critical than it is today. The effective manifestation of the United Nations mentality in Korea has left no alternative for the forces of aggression but to act with great caution in putting into effect their ambitions in other areas.

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY:

The frank, outspoken, and straightforward principles that are unswervingly observed in the administration of our foreign policy have served to convince all who are of good will in the field of international relations that our thoughts and actions are of a fully realistic character which has no inclination toward opportunism. It is a fact that this policy is based on (1) the preservation of peace and security, (2) respect by all nations for the rights, independence, and territorial integrity of other peoples, (3) the aim to make the high ideals of civilization and justice prevail throughout the universe, (4) friendly cooperation with those who furnish concrete proof of their attachment to these same ideals, which are those espoused by the United Nations, and (5) a firm, courageous, and prepared attitude towards those of ill-will.

In stressing these truths before your high Assembly, I cannot refrain from repeating once again, for the benefit of world public opinion, that this policy is as much suited to the ideals of the United Nations and to the best interests of the world in general as it is to our own national interests and to our ideals of peace.

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